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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Picture a dark brown cloud of smog settling in a valley. Ozone 
levels are extremely high; so high that breathing the air could decrease 
respiratory function or exacerbate asthma. Are you picturing a city like 
Houston or Los Angeles on a hot summer day? Try the wide-open plains 
of northeast Utah in the middle of winter.  
 In 2011, Ozone levels in Utah’s Uintah Basin, an area of about 
5,853,000 acres in northeast Utah,1 were observed at 185 percent of the 
levels that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) considers safe 
for human health.2 Scientists, land managers, and the oil and gas industry 
are beginning to realize that the ozone problem is caused in part by 
extensive mineral development in the region.3 A similar winter ozone 
problem was first seen in the Jonah natural gas field in Wyoming’s 
Upper Green River Basin,4 and it could happen some day in the Piceance 
Basin in northwestern Colorado.5 This article tackles the question: Why 
can’t federal pollution control laws, like the Clean Air Act, prevent these 
ozone problems? 
 Section II summarizes the extent of winter ozone in the Uintah 
Basin and how current and projected natural gas development are 
contributing to the problem.  
 Section III examines why four federal statutes and two federal 
agencies have not been able to solve the problem. This section examines 
how the EPA’s role in regulating air quality under the Clean Air Act and 
the Bureau of Land Management’s (“BLM”) role as land manager 
responsible for mineral development are not in sync, leaving a big hole 
in ozone regulation for natural gas development.  
 Section IV explores three new policies and regulations both the 
EPA and BLM are employing to attempt to sew up the regulatory hole: a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU)  between the EPA, BLM, and 
other land management agencies; a new Environmental Impact Statement 
                                                 
1. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., VERNAL FIELD OFFICE, GREATER UINTA BASIN OIL AND 
GAS CUMULATIVE IMPACTS TECHNICAL SUPPORT DOCUMENT § 1.2 (2012) [hereinafter UINTA 
CUMULATIVE IMPACTS DOC.]. Uintah is alternatively spelled “Uinta.” 
2. ENERGY DYNAMICS LABORATORY, UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, 
DOCUMENT NO. EDL/11-039, UINTA BASIN WINTER OZONE AND AIR QUALITY STUDY, DECEMBER 
2010 – MARCH 2011 42 (2011) [hereinafter UINTAH BASIN OZONE STUDY]. 
3. Id. at 97. 
4. Russell C. Schnell, et al., Rapid Photochemical Production of Ozone at High Concentrations 
in a Rural Site During Winter, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 120 (2009). 
5. Mark Jaffe, Like Wyoming, Utah Finds High Wintertime Ozone Pollution Near Oil, Gas 
Wells, DENVER POST, Feb. 26, 2012, http://www.denverpost.com/business/ci_20042330. 
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(“EIS”) for natural gas development in the Uinah Basin; and new 
regulations under the Clean Air Act specifically targeting emissions from 
small-scale natural gas production.  
 Finally, Section V concludes with recommendations on additional 
steps that must be taken to ensure basin-wide decreases in ozone levels to 
environmentally healthy levels. 
II. THE OZONE PROBLEM IN THE UINTAH BASIN 
  About 70 percent of the Uintah Basin is owned by the federal 
government and managed for mineral development by the BLM out of 
the Vernal Field office in Vernal, Utah.6 It is already heavily developed 
for oil and gas production, with 15,000 oil and gas wells.7 See Figure 1, 
below. The BLM estimates a current total surface disturbance of 23,493 
acres.8 Based on pending National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) 
projects, the BLM foresees an additional 15,796 new well pads and 
28,417 new wells.9 While not all of the projected new development will 
be natural gas, a large portion of it will. For example, former secretary of 
the interior Salazar recently approved 3,675 new natural gas wells in the 
162,911-acre Greater Natural Buttes Project Area (GNBPA) area of the 
Uintah Basin.10 This project will result in new surface disturbance of 
8,147 acres, or 5 percent of the GNBPA.11 To put the new project in 
perspective, the current development in the GNBPA is 1,562 productive 
natural gas wells on 7,766 acres.12 Additionally, all the approved 
development in the GNBPA will involve hydraulic fracturing,13 a process 
that releases some natural gas into the atmosphere and leads to ozone 
formation.14 
                                                 
6. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., VERNAL FIELD OFFICE, RECORD OF DECISION AND 
APPROVED RESOURCE MANAGEMENT PLAN 4 (2008) [hereinafter VERNAL RMP]. 
7. UINTA CUMULATIVE IMPACTS DOC., supra note 1, at tbl. 2-3. Only 9,000 are active. Id. 
8. VERNAL RMP, supra note 6, at 4; UINTA CUMULATIVE IMPACTS DOC., supra note 1, at tbl. 
2-5. 
9. VERNAL RMP, supra note 6, at 4; UINTA CUMULATIVE IMPACTS DOC., supra note 1, at tbl. 
3-2. Note that well pads are between 2.5 and 5.8 acres in size. Id. at tbl. 2-5. Depending on the size 
of the well pad, it can hold 1 to 12 wells. Id. at tbl. 2-4. 
10. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., VERNAL FIELD OFFICE, UT-080-07807, GREATER 
NATURAL BUTTES RECORD OF DECISION (2012) [hereinafter GREATER NATURAL BUTTES ROD]. 
11. Id. § 3. 
12. Id. § 2. 
13. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., VERNAL FIELD OFFICE, GREATER NATURAL BUTTES 
FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT, FES 12-8 § 2.5.3.3 (2012) [hereinafter GREATER 
NATURAL BUTTES EIS]. 
14. U. S. EVTL. PROT. AGENCY, FACT SHEET, OVERVIEW OF FINAL AMENDMENTS TO AIR 
REGULATIONS FOR THE OIL AND NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY 3 (2012), available at 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/pdfs/20110728factsheet.pdf [hereinafter NSPS REGS FACT 
SHEET]. 
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Figure 1: Winter 2011 Uinta Basin ozone sampling locations with 
an overlay of known ozone precursor point sources and active 
oil/gas wells. Figure 2-2 of UINTAH BASIN OZONE STUDY, supra 
note 2. 
 Ozone is typically a summer phenomenon in large cities because the 
components necessary to create ozone are present at that time. Ozone 
comes from the combination of oxides of nitrogen (NOx), volatile 
organic compounds (VOCs), and sunlight.15 Scientists believe that in the 
Uintah Basin, NOx and VOCs coming from natural gas development and 
sunlight reflecting off of snow is strong enough to create ozone.16 This 
process is further promoted by a temperature inversion in the winter that 
keeps the air settled in the lower elevations of the Uintah Basin, helping 
to maintain the chemical soup necessary for ozone creation.17  
 While ozone high up in the stratosphere is necessary to protect us 
from harmful ultraviolet radiation,18 high levels of ozone in the ambient 
air (the air we breathe) is harmful to human health.19 Ozone is known to 
                                                 
15. UINTAH BASIN OZONE STUDY, supra note 2, at 15. 
16. Id. at 97. 
17. Id. 
18. Id. at 14. 
19. Id.; see also Health Effects of Ozone in the General Population, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/apti/ozonehealth/population.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
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exacerbate asthma and cause other respiratory problems.20 In compliance 
with the Clean Air Act, the EPA determined that the level of ozone that 
is safe for human health is seventy-five parts per billion (ppb).21 To 
determine whether an area exceeds this level, the EPA looks at the eight-
hour running average concentration of ozone.22  
 In a recent study in the Uintah Basin, thirteen out of fifteen sites 
exceeded this level at least once during a three-month period in the 
winter of 2011.23 Ten of the sites had eight-hour periods that exceeded 
100 ppb, and the highest site recorded 139 ppb.24 That is 185 percent of 
the EPA’s acceptable level. The Uintah Basin study found that elevated 
ozone levels correlated with locations of oil and gas wells in the basin. 
NOx and VOCs are known to come from natural gas development, and 
thus so does ozone. Despite the observance of ozone levels above the 
EPA standard, the EPA does not deem this data sufficient to consider the 
area in non-attainment under the Clean Air Act.25 
 The EIS for projected oil and gas development in GNBPA of the 
Uintah Basin cataloged different sources of NOx and VOCs from natural 
gas development.26 These sources include: drill rig engines, drill rig 
boilers, drilling and production traffic, production wells, water tank 
batteries, and compressor engines.27 Another significant source of VOCs 
is hydraulic fracturing, which is commonly used to enhance natural gas 
production.28 The GNBPA was approved despite the fact that the 
accompanying EIS indicated ozone levels are likely to exceed the EPA 
standards even without the new project.29  
 The remainder of this article explores why. 
                                                 
20. UINTAH BASIN OZONE STUDY, supra note 2, at 14; see also Health Effects of Ozone in the 
General Population, supra note19. 
21. This is the National Ambient Air Quality Standard (NAAQS) for ozone. National Ambient 
Air Quality Standards (NAAQS), U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/air/criteria.html 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2013). EPA is in the process of revising this standard and is likely to lower it in 
2013. See Regulatory Actions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/glo/actions.html 
(last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
22. UINTAH BASIN OZONE STUDY, supra note 2, at 39. 
23. Id. at tbl. 4-1. 
24. Id. 
25. Currently Designated Nonattainment Areas for all Criteria Pollutants, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. 
AGENCY, http://www.epa.gov/oaqps001/greenbk/ancl.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
26. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, at tbl. 4.1-3. 
27. Id. 
28. Oil and Natural Gas Air Pollution Standards, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, 
http://www.epa.gov/airquality/oilandgas/ (last visited Apr. 17, 2013). 
29. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, § 4.1.1.4. 
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III. FOUR FEDERAL STATUTES + TWO AGENCIES = A REGULATORY 
HOLE 
 Four major federal laws apply to air quality and natural gas 
development on federal public lands, but none of them alone or together 
have been able to prevent the ozone problem in the Uintah Basin. The 
Clean Air Act regulates air quality of criteria pollutants like ozone, but it 
does not require permits for small sources of pollution like natural gas 
wells.30 The Mineral Leasing Act authorizes the BLM to lease and permit 
natural gas development, and it contains no environmental safeguards.31 
The National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) requires all federal 
agencies to consider the environmental impacts of their “major” 
activities, including leasing and permitting natural gas wells.32 But 
NEPA does not require an agency to choose the least harmful alternative 
or  mitigate  foreseeable damage.33 Finally, the Federal Land Use Policy 
and Management Act (“FLPMA”) requires the BLM to conduct land use 
planning before leasing any lands for natural gas development.34 
However, the multi-staged process by which the BLM permits small 
areas at a time ensures that its NEPA analysis is not broad enough to 
contemplate the environmental impacts of large-scale natural gas 
development.35  
 This section explores the three reasons for the lack of regulation 
governing the ozone problem in the Uintah basin, and how the 
disconnect in federal laws means that each agency is addressing only its 
own small part, and no single agency is comprehensively dealing with 
the problem.  
 First, the Clean Air Act is not suited to regulate emissions from 
natural gas development. Natural gas well fields are not considered 
“major stationary sources,” so they do not require a pre-construction 
permit under the Act.36 Even if natural gas developers were required to 
get a permit, the Uintah Basin is currently in compliance with the air 
quality standard for ozone.37 Thus, under the Clean Air Act, the EPA 
                                                 
30. See infra Part III.A.2. 
31. Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-196 (2012); 43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-2 (2012); see supra 
Part III.B.1. 
32. 42 USC § 4332 (2012); see infra Part III.B.2. 
33. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“NEPA does not 
prohibit the undertaking of federal projects patently destructive of the environment; it simply 
mandates that the agency gather, study and disseminate information concerning the projects’ 
environmental consequences.”); see also OLGA L. MOYA & ANDREW L. FONO, FEDERAL 
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW USER’S GUIDE 57 (West 2d ed. 2001). 
34. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2012); see infra Part III.B.1. 
35. 43 U.S.C. § 1712; infra Part III.B.3. 
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j) (2012) (definition of major stationary source). 
37. Currently Designated Nonattainment Areas for all Criteria Pollutants, supra note 25. 
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cannot require pollution controls on existing sources and can only require 
limited controls on new sources.38  
 Second, the BLM is using its discretion over mineral leasing and 
environmental analysis to develop natural gas at a rate that is not 
protective of air quality in the Uintah Basin. The BLM’s mission to 
develop mineral resources is strong under the Mineral Leasing Act and 
the more recent Energy and Policy Act of 2005.39 Alternatively, the 
BLM’s obligation to ensure environmental protection by all activities it 
permits is relatively weak under NEPA and FLPMA.40 The BLM has a 
lot of discretion regarding when it conducts environmental analysis, how 
deep it looks for significant impacts, and when it requires mitigation as a 
lease or permit stipulation. In effect, the BLM has been allowing 
significant natural gas development at the expense of air quality.  
  Finally, the EPA and BLM are not working together effectively to 
reduce ozone levels in the Uintah Basin. Because each agency operates 
under a different directive and different statutes, their missions do not 
overlap. While the EPA must enforce the Clean Air Act, the BLM is 
charged with leasing and permitting gas development. The EPA can 
encourage the BLM to require more mitigation of air quality degradation 
from natural gas development, but it has no authority to force the BLM 
to require mitigation.41 The somewhat conflicting missions of the EPA 
and BLM do not allow them to work together, and the Uintah Basin air 
quality suffers. 
A. The Clean Air Act Does Not Regulate All Sources of Ozone in the Uin-
tah Basin 
 Under the Clean Air Act, the EPA regulates ozone as a criteria 
pollutant because it is harmful to human health at certain concentrations. 
However, the Clean Air Act only provides for regulation of large 
stationary sources of emissions, so the EPA does not currently regulate 
wells and other small sources of emissions from natural gas 
development, which is where the current ozone problem arises.42 
                                                 
38. MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 268 (under PSD, EPA can only require BACT for new 
sources, not existing sources); 42 U.S.C. § 7411(a) (definition of new stationary sources). 
39. Infra Part III.B.3. 
40. Id. 
41. Infra Part III.C. 
42. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, at tbl. 4.1-3. 
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1. General Provisions of the Clean Air Act 
 The Clean Air Act was originally enacted in 1963 to study the 
nation’s air pollution problems and fix them.43 In 1970, The Clean Air 
Act was amended to create a comprehensive federal response to air 
pollution.44 At the same time, Congress created the EPA and gave it 
authority to carry out the Clean Air Act.45 The main concern of the Clean 
Air Act is the regulation of six “criteria pollutants”—particulate matter, 
ground-level ozone, carbon monoxide, sulfur oxides, nitrogen oxides, 
and lead.46 These pollutants became criteria pollutants because the EPA 
determined that they posed a significant threat to public health.47  
 Once the EPA established the criteria pollutants, it determined the 
acceptable level of each pollutant in the ambient air in order to “protect 
human health with a margin of safety.”48 This acceptable level became 
the primary standard or National Ambient Air Quality Standard 
(NAAQS) by which all air quality is measured.49 If any particular region 
of the country does not meet the NAAQS for any of the six criteria 
pollutants, that region is in “non-attainment” for that pollutant.50  
 The EPA sets different technology-based regulations for meeting 
the NAAQS, depending on whether a region is in attainment or not.51 
The goal is to bring non-attainment areas into attainment and maintain 
air quality in areas that are already in attainment.52 Emissions controls in 
areas of attainment only apply to new or modified sources, and they are 
less strict than emissions controls for non-attainment areas.53 Emission 
controls in non-attainment areas apply to both new and existing 
stationary sources, although the technology required for new or modified 
sources is more stringent than the requirements for existing sources.54  
 In part to ensure adequate regulation of existing sources, the EPA 
can issue a New Source Performance Standard (“NSPS”), which is a 
                                                 
43. EPA OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING AND STANDARDS, EPA-456/K-07-001, THE PLAIN 




46. Id. at 4; 42 U.S.C. § 7409 (2012). 
47. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1).; see also PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra 
note 43, at 4; MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 250. 
48. PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 43, at 4; 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7409(b)(1). 
49. PLAIN ENGLISH GUIDE TO THE CLEAN AIR ACT, supra note 43, at 4. 
50. Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 7407(d). 
51. 42 U.S.C. § 7502(c) (provisions for emissions controls in non-attainment areas); Id. § 7408 
(provisions for emissions controls in attainment (“PSD”) areas). 
52. See MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 241. 
53. See id. at 267–68. 
54. See id. at 263–64. 
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technology-based standard that applies to certain categories of stationary 
sources that emit certain pollutants.55 An NSPS generally applies only to 
new sources or modifications of existing sources, but the EPA does have 
authority to enforce an NSPS for existing sources.56 The EPA can choose 
to apply an NSPS to any source that emits a pollutant that the EPA 
determines “may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health.”57 
NSPSs are useful because they allow the EPA to enforce standard 
emission controls over an entire industry across the country, regardless 
of whether the source exists in an area of attainment or not.58 For 
example, the EPA has an NSPS for petroleum refineries.59  
 Despite the expansive and complex regulatory system that evolved 
under the Clean Air Act, the EPA cannot adequately regulate ozone 
production from natural gas development. 
2. Ozone from Natural Gas Development is Slipping Through the 
Hole in the Clean Air Act 
 The Clean Air Act is not suited to regulate emissions from natural 
gas development in the Uintah Basin for two reasons. First, the pollution 
from well fields comes from many disparate sources, and none of these 
sources are considered a “major stationary source” under the Act. 
Second, despite the high levels of winter ozone in the past three years, 
the Uintah Basin is still considered in compliance with respect to ozone, 
under the NAAQs. 
 The Clean Air Act defines a “major source” as “any stationary 
facility or source of air pollutants which directly emits, or has the 
potential to emit, one hundred tons per year or more of any air 
pollutant.”60 If a pollution source is considered major, then it must get a 
pre-construction permit.61 The permit will allow the source to emit 
certain levels of each criteria pollutant, depending on whether the area is 
in attainment of the NAAQS for that pollutant.62 For example, natural 
gas compressor stations must get a permit for emissions of A, B, C 
pollutants. The level of A, B, and/or C that it can emit and the level of 
emissions controls it must install are more stringent if the refinery is 
going to operate in a non-attainment area for A, B, and/or C pollutant.  
                                                 
55. See id. at 244–46; 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
56. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(d)(1)(A); see also ROY S. BELDEN, BASIC PRACTICE SERIES: CLEAN 
AIR ACT 79 (2d ed. 2011). 
57. 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b); see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 243. 
58. 42 U.S.C. § 7411. 
59. 40 C.F.R. § 60.100 (2012); see also BELDEN, supra note 56, at 79–80. 
60. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j); see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 243, 261. 
61. 42 U.S.C. § 7602(j); see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 243, 261. 
62. 42 U.S.C. § 7503; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 241–42. 
304 Seattle Journal of Environmental Law [Vol. 3:295 
 On the other hand, the Clean Air Act does not regulate small 
pollution sources from natural gas development like wells, storage tanks, 
dehydrators generators, and trucks. The NOx and VOC emissions from 
these minor sources are significantly contributing to the problem of 
ozone in the Uintah Basin.63 If the EPA would aggregate these minor 
sources with compressor stations to form one major source, then all 
emissions from natural gas development would be regulated under Clean 
Air Act. WildEarth Guardians, an environmental advocacy group, tried 
to argue this point for a well field in northern Colorado, but the EPA 
rejected its position in 2011.64  
 The second reason the Clean Air Act does not regulate ozone 
emissions in the Uintah Basin is that the area is still considered in 
attainment for the ozone NAAQS. If, however, the area was in non-
attainment for ozone, the EPA would have to ensure that all sources of 
ozone were regulated to bring the region into compliance.65 That would 
mean new and existing major sources would need to adhere to pollution 
control measures.66 While non-attainment would still not ensure 
regulation of small sources of ozone from natural gas development,67 it 
would ensure more stringent emissions controls on new and existing 
compressor stations that already need a major source permit. Despite the 
findings of the Uintah Basin Study, as of April 2013, the EPA does not 
deem this information sufficient to consider the Uintah Basin a non-
attainment area for ozone.68 
                                                 
63. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, at tbl. 4.1-3. 
64. WildEarth Guardians petitioned EPA in 2009 to force Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment to reconsider CDPHE’s decision to not aggregate smaller sources with a 
compressor station’s state permit. Kerr McGee/Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Frederick 
Compressor Station, Order Responding to Petitioner’s Request That Administrator Object to 
Issuance of a State Operating Permit, Petition No. VIII-2008-02 (Oct. 8, 2009). CDPHE did 
additional analysis and determined that aggregation was not necessary. Kerr McGee/Anadarko 
Petroleum Corporation, Frederick Compressor Station, Response of Colorado Department of Public 
Health and Environment, Air Pollution Control Division, To Order Granting Petition For Objection 
to Permit, Petition No. VIII-2008-02 (July 14, 2010). EPA approved CDPHE’s analysis and refused 
to deny the permit in 2011. EPA approved CDPHE’s analysis and refused to deny the permit in 
2011. In re Kerr McGee/Anadarko Petroleum Corporation, Frederick Compressor Station, Order 
Responding to Petitioner’s Request That the Administrator Object to Issuance of a State Operating 
Permit, Petition No. VIII-2008-02 (Feb. 2, 2011). 
65. 42 U.S.C. § 7503; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 241–42. 
66. Id. 
67. See MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 263–64 (even in non-attainment areas, it is more 
difficult to regulate existing sources); see also id. at 243, 261 (the Clean Air Act does not regulate 
small sources as stringently as major sources). 
68. Currently Designated Nonattainment Areas for all Criteria Pollutants, supra note 25. 
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B. The BLM’s Wide Discretion Over Natural Gas Development and En-
vironmental Analysis is Widening the Regulatory Hole 
 As land manager in the Uintah Basin, the BLM’s wide discretion in 
oil and gas permitting decisions also effects ozone production from 
natural gas development. One of the BLM’s primary responsibilities is 
managing mineral leasing on federal public lands. The BLM must 
conduct land use planning to ensure consistency in management. The 
BLM has a “multiple-use” mandate, and environmental protection is just 
one of the factors it considers when making land use decisions. 
Therefore, air quality and ambient levels of ozone are not always 
adequately considered in the BLM’s mineral leasing decisions. 
1. The BLM’s Mineral Leasing Authority and Land-Use Planning 
Obligations 
 Under the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, mineral leasing on federal 
public lands comes under the authority of the Secretary of Interior.69 By 
regulation, the Secretary of Interior has delegated his or her mineral 
leasing authority to the BLM.70 Most federal public lands are available 
for leasing, unless they are withdrawn for specific purposes, like national 
parks or monuments.71  
 The BLM is required under the Federal Land Policy and 
Management Act of 1976 (“FLPMA”) to conduct land use planning72 
and to use such plans for the management of all the BLM lands.73 The 
agency conducts land use planning at the field office level, and the 
process begins as a Resource Management Plan (RMP).74 After the 
approval of an RMP by the Secretary, any future actions by the BLM 
field office must be done in accordance with the RMP.75 
 FLPMA provides some guidance on the necessary content and 
considerations for RMPs.76 FLPMA states that the BLM should “observe 
the principles of multiple use and sustained yield”77; use a systematic and 
                                                 
69. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (2013). The Mineral Leasing Act withdrew oil and gas from availability 
for mineral location under the 1872 Mining Law. Id. 
70. 43 C.F.R. § 3160.0-2 (2013). 
71. 30 U.S.C. § 181. 
72. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2013). 
73. 43 U.S.C. § 1732(a). 
74. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., H-1601-1, LAND USE PLANNING HANDBOOK 1 (2005) 
[hereinafter BLM LAND USE PLANNING HANDBOOK] (BLM implements planning obligations under 
FLPMA 30 U.S.C. § 1712 and 43 C.F.R § 1600 by creating Resource Management Plans). 
75. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2013). 
76. See generally 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c); see also, GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS & ROBERT L. 
GLICKSMAN, PUBLIC NATURAL RESOURCES LAW § 16:19 (2d ed. 2013), available at Westlaw 2 
PUB. NAT. RESOURCES L. § 16:19. 
77. 43 U.S.C. § 1712(c)(1). 
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interdisciplinary approach to consider the “physical, biological, 
economic, and other sciences”78; “weigh long-term benefits to the public 
against short-term benefits;”79 “provide for compliance with applicable 
pollution control laws”80; and, to the extent practical, involve state and 
local decision makers in the planning process to ensure that BLM land 
use plans are consistent with state and local plans.81 But FLPMA gives 
the BLM wide discretion on how to create RMPs, especially how much 
environmental compliance is required of its licensees and permittees.  
 While there are no explicit instructions in either statutes or agency 
regulations requiring the BLM to assess leasing scenarios in an RMP, 
most RMPs do consider leasing if the BLM anticipates interest in oil or 
gas development during the life of the RMP. However, if an RMP 
designates lands as “open” to possible leasing, this designation does not 
mandate leasing.82 RMPs cover large areas over long time frames. 
Therefore, changing circumstances, updated policies, and new 
information between the RMP and the leasing stage may require 
additional planning and analysis.83 By the time the BLM gets ready to 
put a parcel of lands up for auction, leasing may no longer be the best use 
of the resource. The BLM might decide not to lease the parcel, if for 
example, new information shows that the environmental impacts are 
greater than the economic value of developing the minerals.  
 In 2010, the Secretary of Interior addressed this problem by issuing 
a guidance document that instructed the BLM to create Master Leasing 
Plans (MLP) as an additional step to analyze the impacts of and potential 
alternatives to leasing decisions.84 MLPs are created as a supplement or 
amendment to RMPs before leases are issued.85 In the MLP, the BLM 
must reconsider decisions about resource protection and whether 
additional stipulations or prohibitions should be imposed on new 
leases.86  
 Once the BLM decides to offer leases, interested developers can bid 
on them at auction.87 A lease, however, does not give a developer free 
reign to drill however or whenever it wants. The BLM has the authority 
                                                 
78. Id. § 1712(c)(2). 
79. Id. § 1712(c)(7). 
80. Id. § 1712(c)(8). 
81. Id. § 1712(c)(9). 
82. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., INSTRUCTION MEMO 2010-117 § I.A (2010) [hereinafter 
BLM INSTRUCTION MEMO], available at http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/info/regulations/Instruction_
Memos_and_Bulletins/national_instruction/2010/IM_2010-117.html. 




87. 30 U.S.C. § 226(b) (2013). 
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to put stipulations in leases for a variety of reasons, including 
environmental protection.88 These may include time of year restrictions 
to protect sensitive habitats or other environmental values.89 It is 
important for the BLM to put any necessary stipulations in a lease 
because if the BLM decides to limit any development later due to 
environmental concerns it can amount to an unlawful taking if there is no 
stipulation in the lease.90 If it turns out that a lease is not profitable in the 
end, the lease owner has no recourse against the federal government.91 
 Moreover, a developer must apply for a permit to drill for 
exploration and then apply for another permit to drill and develop the 
well field.92 A successful Application for Permit to Drill (“APD”) must 
contain a detailed description of all operations, including uses of roads 
and rights-of-way.93 The developer must submit a separate APD for each 
well.94 Usually, the BLM will review several APDs together as one 
project.95  
 In sum, the BLM’s multiple-use mandate and multi-stage permitting 
process means that air quality and ambient levels of ozone are not always 
adequately considered in the BLM’s mineral leasing decisions. 
2. NEPA in the Context of Mineral Leasing 
 NEPA requirements help force the BLM to consider environmental 
impacts of its actions. Enacted in 1970 to increase environmental 
protection by federal agencies,96 NEPA directs all federal agencies, 
except the President and Congress, to consider the effects of any “major 
federal action” on the human environment before taking such action.97 
Congress granted regulatory authority under NEPA to the President’s 
Council on Environmental Quality (“CEQ”).98 
 NEPA is a procedural, rather than a substantive, environmental 
statute because it does not proscribe any particular actions. Rather, 
NEPA dictates the procedures that federal agencies must follow before 
                                                 
88. Id. § 226(g); 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-3 (2013). 
89. 43 C.F.R. § 3503.28. 
90. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.1-4 (BLM can only modify a lease if it will not cause unacceptable 
impacts). 
91. 30 U.S.C. § 226. 
92. 43 C.F.R. § 3162.3-1. 
93. Id. § 3162.3-1(d). 
94. Id. § 3162.3-1. 
95. Id. 
96. 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (2013); see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 52. 
97. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 52. 
98. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4342; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note33, at 78 (President Carter 
gave the CEQ the authority to issue binding regulations in 1977). 
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implementing any federal action.99 NEPA requires federal agencies to 
take a “hard look at environmental consequences,” but it does not require 
the agencies to choose the most environmentally preferable alternative.100 
Agencies may also consider economic and technical considerations when 
choosing the preferred action.101 
 NEPA requires that agencies conduct and document a thorough 
investigation in order to determine whether and how any proposed action 
is likely to affect the human environment.102 This investigation must be 
done before any irretrievable commitment of resources is made,103 but it 
may be done at any time where it will be helpful for agency planning or 
decision-making.104  
 If the agency action is not likely to have a significant effect on the 
environment, or if the environmental impact can be mitigated, then the 
agency issues an Environmental Assessment (“EA”) and a Finding of No 
Significant Impact (“FONSI”) and the action may proceed.105  
 Alternatively, if the proposed action is likely to significantly affect 
the environment, the agency must conduct a more extensive investigation 
and produce an Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”).106 An EIS 
must be a comprehensive analysis of the likely environmental impacts of 
the proposed federal action and multiple alternatives.107 Its purpose is to 
aid agencies in making informed decisions about how their actions will 
affect the environment and how best to avoid or minimize those 
impacts.108 In so doing, the EIS must include an analysis of direct, 
indirect, and cumulative impacts.109  
                                                 
99. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 350 (1989) (“NEPA does not 
prohibit the undertaking of federal projects patently destructive of the environment; it simply 
mandates that the agency gather, study and disseminate information concerning the projects’ 
environmental consequences.”); see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 57. 
100. Robertson, 490 U.S. at 350; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 57. 
101. 40 C.F.R. § 1505.2(b) (2013). 
102. 42 U.S.C. § 4332; 40 C.F.R. § 1501; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 52. 
103. Conner v. Buford, 848 F.2d 1441, 1446 (9th Cir. 1988); see also MOYA & FONO, supra 
note 33, at 80. 
104. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.3(b). 
105. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4(e), 1508.13; see also MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 75. 
106. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4; 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (definition of “significantly”). 
107. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.2(d), (e); § 1502.16(d). 
108. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.1. 
109. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16 (a), (b). The CEQ regulations define “cumulative impact” as “the 
impact on the environment which results from the incremental impact of the action when added to 
other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what agency (Federal or 
non-Federal) or person undertakes such other action. Cumulative impacts can result from 
individually minor but collectively significant actions taking place over a period of time.” 40 C.F.R. 
§ 1508.7 
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 NEPA does not require agencies to mitigate environmental 
impacts,110 but agencies must discuss in the EIS any mitigation measures 
they plan to take.111 New CEQ guidance provides that agencies that 
create mitigation plans in their EISs should set up procedures to ensure 
follow through.112 However, if a FONSI is predicated on the promise of 
mitigation, then the project developer is bound to perform the 
mitigation.113 
 The BLM is required to do NEPA analysis at several steps in the 
mineral leasing process:  
1. In conjunction with an RMP;114  
2. In conjunction with an MLP;115  
3. Before leasing;116  
4. Before approving an APD permit to drill for exploration;117 and  
5. Before approving an APD permit to drill development.118  
 Analysis of environmental impacts at each of these stages is 
necessary because each stage becomes increasingly detailed. The 
environmental impacts analyzed at the RMP phase may not be as 
significant as those analyzed at the APD phase. For example, the RMP 
will not identify the specific placement, spacing, and number of wells, 
but the APD will.  
 According to the BLM departmental manual, approving an RMP is 
one of the actions that typically require an EIS, rather than merely an 
EA.119 At the RMP stage, the BLM analyzes the environmental impacts 
of opening specific areas for leasing. Otherwise, the leasing activity 
might be considered outside the scope of the RMP, which would violate 
FLPMA.120 Furthermore, it would be a “major federal action” that was 
not previously analyzed under NEPA.121 However, if an RMP did not 
consider leasing and an oil or gas developer expresses an interest in 
                                                 
110. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 352 (1989); see also MOYA 
& FONO, supra note 33, at 90. 
111. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.14(f), 1502.16(h) (emphasis added). 
112. Final Guidance for Federal Departments and Agencies on the Appropriate Use of 
Mitigated Findings of No Significant Impact, 76 Fed. Reg. 3843 (Jan. 21, 2011). 
113. See MOYA & FONO, supra note 33, at 89. 
114. 43 C.F.R. § 1601.0-6 (2013). 
115. BLM INSTRUCTION MEMO, supra note 82, § II. 
116. Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2006). 
117. U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., H-1790-1, NEPA HANDBOOK §3.3 (2008) [hereinafter 
BLM NEPA HANDBOOK] (the approval of an APD is a “major federal action”). 
118. Id. 
119. U. S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR, 516 DM 11, DEP’T MANUAL BUREAU OF RECLAMATION 
11.8.B (2008), available at http://www.blm.gov/wo/st/en/prog/planning/nepa/webguide/departmenta
l_manual/516_dm_chapter_11.html. 
120. 43 C.F.R. § 1610.5-3(a) (2013). 
121. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2013). 
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leasing, then the BLM field office can conduct a supplemental EA or EIS 
to evaluate the environmental impacts.122  
 The bigger question that has not been resolved is when must the 
BLM conduct additional NEPA analysis before approving an APD for 
exploration or resource development.123 Statistically, only one in ten 
leases are drilled and only one in ten drilled leases produces commercial 
quantities of oil or gas.124 Thus, the BLM has successfully argued that it 
cannot possibly do an adequate EIS of the effects of well drilling at the 
leasing stage because there is too much uncertainty about the extent of 
actual drilling.125 Although the BLM must always do additional NEPA 
analysis before it approves an APD, sometimes only an EA will satisfy 
NEPA, and other times an EIS is necessary at the APD phase.126 The 
point in the process when the BLM decides to do an EIS may affect how 
and whether air quality is adequately protected. 
3. The BLM Lacks the Resources and Directive to Close the Air 
Quality Hole 
 While both NEPA and FLPMA require the BLM to ensure 
compliance with environmental laws, the BLM does not have the 
resources or capacity to monitor air quality and ensure that the entire area 
of oil and gas development is in compliance with the NAAQS.127 The 
BLM is a land management agency with a strong Congressional directive 
to get domestic oil and gas out of the ground.128 Under FLPMA, the 
BLM is required to do land use planning,129 and under NEPA, the BLM 
is required to do environmental analysis.130 However, neither statute 
directs the BLM about the stringency of potential mitigation measures in 
                                                 
122. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.9 (2013). 
123. COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 76, § 39.24 (“The question of exactly when to do 
environmental evaluation is ripe for a dispositive judicial decision.”); GEORGE CAMERON COGGINS 
ET AL., FED. PUB. LAND & RES. LAW 645 (Foundation Press 6th ed. 2007) (citing NATIONAL 
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, LAND USE PLANNING AND OIL AND GAS LEASING ON ONSHORE FEDERAL 
LANDS 10–13 (1989)). 
124. COGGINS, ET AL., supra note 123, at 645 (citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, 
LAND USE PLANNING AND OIL AND GAS LEASING ON ONSHORE FEDERAL LANDS 10–13 (1989)). 
125. Cf. Cnty. of Suffolk v. Sec’y of the Interior, 562 F.2d 1368, 1374 (2d Cir. 1977); see also 
COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 76, § 39.7 n.4. 
126. See COGGINS & GLICKSMAN, supra note 76, § 39.24. 
127. Interview with Leonard Herr, U.S. Bureau of Land Mgmt. (Apr. 5, 2012). 
128. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 15921 (2012); GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, 
§ 1.5.4; Memorandum of Understanding Among the U.S. Department of Agriculture, U.S. 
Department of the Interior, and U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Regarding Air Quality 
Analyses and Mitigation For Federal Oil and Gas Decisions Through the National Environmental 
Policy Act Process, Preamble (2011) [hereinafter MOU]. 
129. 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (2013). 
130. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2013). 
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order to avoid environmental impacts. Further, neither statute directs the 
BLM on whether or how to consider all current and future development 
at one time in order to effectively evaluate the long-term impacts on air 
quality of development in an entire basin.  
 The reality is that the BLM makes leasing decisions without 
considering the impacts of all possible well development because it does 
not know when the operators plan to drill.131 While the BLM does 
consider the specific impact of well permitting decisions for exploration 
and well field development on air quality, it does so rather myopically. 
Specifically, the BLM’s process of analyzing each APD separately may 
cover too small a scale to really identify the cumulative impacts and 
standardize mitigation measures.132 The cumulative impact analysis in 
BLM NEPA documents may consider the relative impact of each 
operator’s actions relating to current operations, but it does not typically 
evaluate the cumulative impacts of all the likely projects in the same 
general area.133 The BLM’s cumulative impacts analysis assesses the 
impacts of all the “reasonable foreseeable development scenarios,” 
which are “those for which there are existing decisions, funding, formal 
proposals, or which are highly probable, based on known opportunities 
or trends.”134 The BLM is not required, however, to speculate about 
future development in its cumulative impacts analysis.135 Therefore, 
when the BLM is evaluating the air quality impacts of an individual APD 
in the Uintah Basin, it does not consider the potential impacts on air 
quality of the full development of the basin. 
 Finally, even when the BLM finds that the proposed well 
development is likely to increase air pollution above the NAAQS, it 
continues to permit new well development.136 For example, in the EIS for 
the approved development in GNBPA, the BLM states that even with the 
no action alternative, ozone levels are projected to exceed the NAAQS in 
the Uintah Basin.137  
                                                 
131. See, e.g., Northern Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d 969 (9th Cir. 2006); but 
see Pennaco Energy Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 377 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2004). 
132. BLM INSTRUCTION MEMO, supra note 82, § II. 
133. See, e.g., U. S. BUREAU OF LAND MGMT., DOI-BLM-UT-G010-2010-0336, 
ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT, QEP ENERGY CO.’S TWO WILDCAT WELLS, UINTAH, UTAH & 
DUCHESNE, UTAH  § 4.3.1 (2012) (this EA for an APD compare the incremental increases of NOx 
and VOCs of this project to the background concentrations and declares that it is insignificant. The 
EA does not compare the increase from this project and any other proposed projects to look at a total 
increase in air pollutants during the life of the project). 
134. BLM NEPA HANDBOOK, supra note 117, § 6.8.3.4. 
135. Id. 
136. See, e.g., GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, § 4.1.1.4. 
137. Id. 
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 This lack of seemingly responsible behavior on the part of the BLM 
is because the BLM’s focus is permitting oil and gas development, not 
protecting air quality. And while environmental health is the EPA’s 
primary responsibility, the EPA cannot force the BLM to make 
permitting decisions that would ensure safe ozone levels. 
C. The EPA and BLM are Not Working Together Effectively to Address 
the Ozone Problem 
 The EPA and BLM have very different functions. The EPA is a 
regulatory agency tasked with upholding environmental laws. It must 
enact and enforce pollution control regulations, unless the enforcement 
has been delegated to a state or tribe. As part of enforcement, the EPA is 
responsible for monitoring emissions and ensuring compliance by all 
permit holders. The BLM, on the other hand, is a management agency 
tasked with managing the public lands for multiple uses, including 
resource extraction. While the BLM must, on paper, require its licensees 
and permittees to comply with all federal pollution control laws, it lacks 
either the means or the legal directive to ensure compliance. Similarly, 
while the EPA has the capacity and authority to ensure compliance with 
the Clean Air Act, its hands are tied when it comes to forcing the hand of 
the BLM in leasing and permitting decisions.  
 The NEPA process is the key place where both the EPA and BLM 
can mitigate air emissions because emissions from the disparate sources 
in a natural gas well field are not major, and thus not regulated under the 
Clean Air Act. Nevertheless, a NEPA review is not an ideal process from 
the perspective of pollution control and environmental protection 
because the purpose of NEPA is environmental impact analysis, not 
environmental protection.  
 Section 309 of the Clean Air Act authorizes the EPA to review 
proposed actions of other agencies to ensure compliance with NEPA 
guidelines.138 The EPA will rate an EIS for the adequacy of the 
environmental analysis and the overall impact of the project on the 
environment.139 Specifically, the EPA looks at the cumulative impacts 
analysis and whether the EIS adequately assessed the impact of all past, 
present, and reasonably foreseeable actions related to the proposed 
action.140 The EPA will also suggest mitigation measures that the action 
agency could impose on project operators that will decrease the 
                                                 
138. 42 U.S.C. § 7609 (2013). 
139. U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, POLICY AND PROCEDURES FOR THE REVIEW OF FEDERAL 
ACTIONS IMPACTING THE ENVIRONMENT ch. 4, § 4 (1984) [hereinafter EPA NEPA REVIEW DOC]. 
140. U. S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CONSIDERATION OF CUMULATIVE IMPACTS IN EPA REVIEW 
OF NEPA DOCUMENTS § 4.3 (1999) [hereinafter EPA CUMULATIVE IMPACTS REVIEW DOC]. 
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environmental impact of the project.141 If the EPA determines that the 
agency’s NEPA document is unsatisfactory, and the BLM refuses to 
change the EIS, then the EPA can send the matter to the CEQ, which has 
authority to force the BLM to redo its NEPA document.142 However, the 
BLM makes the final determination of what alternative to use and what 
(if any) mitigation measures to impose on the operators. In the case of 
mineral leasing, even if the BLM has the best intentions to prevent ozone 
pollution, the multi-stage process of planning, leasing, permitting for 
exploration, and permitting for development make it very difficult for the 
BLM to adequately assess the environmental impacts in enough time to 
do something about it. 
 This section described how four major federal laws apply to air 
quality and natural gas development on federal public lands, but none of 
them, alone or together, have been able to prevent the ozone problem in 
the Uintah Basin. The next section explores new policies and regulations 
enacted by the EPA and BLM that may help sew up this regulatory hole. 
IV. NEW POLICIES THAT MAY HELP SEW UP THE REGULATORY HOLE 
 In the past few years, the EPA has been working to create 
cooperative and comprehensive air quality regulations. First, in 2011 the 
EPA negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between 
itself, the Department of Interior (where the BLM resides), and the 
Department of Agriculture (where the National Forest Service resides143) 
to increase consistency in air quality monitoring and mitigation related to 
oil and gas operations on federal public lands.144 Second, the BLM is 
increasing its consideration of air quality impacts as it permits new gas 
wells in the Uintah Basin.145 Finally, the EPA just released new NSPS 
regulations for natural gas operations that require more stringent 
pollution control measures, regardless of attainment status.146 
A. MOU Between Federal Agencies to Increase Air Quality Monitoring 
 In June 2011, the EPA, Department of Interior, and Department of 
Agriculture entered into an MOU in an effort to create a standardized 
approach to evaluating and mitigating air quality impacts of future oil 
                                                 
141. Id. § 3. 
142. EPA NEPA REVIEW DOC, supra note 139, at ch. 9, § 1. 
143. Some oil and gas leases are on National Forest land, but even these are regulated and 
permitted through the BLM. 
144. MOU, supra note 128. 
145. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, at ch. 3, ch. 4. 
146. NSPS REGS FACT SHEET, supra note 14. 
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and gas development.147 The MOU’s goal is to increase collaboration 
among the agencies during the NEPA process in order to protect air 
quality and facilitate development of the nation’s oil and gas 
resources.148 The MOU notes the need for “predictable, science-based 
processes to protect air quality,” while at the same time “eliminat[ing] 
unnecessary uncertainty and delay” in the permitting process.149 The 
agencies promise to collaborate on the NEPA process, and the EPA 
promises to give good ratings to the resulting NEPA analyses.150 Further, 
the agencies promise to “strive to ensure, to the maximum extent 
practicable, that Federal decisions relating to oil and gas will not cause or 
contribute to exceedances of the NAAQS . . . .”151 The procedures set out 
in the MOU apply to all stages of the oil and gas planning and permitting 
process where NEPA is required, from general RMPs to potential region-
wide MLPs to project-specific APDs. 
 The substantive focus of the MOU is to institute standardized 
procedures for identifying air quality impacts of proposed oil and gas 
development. This is accomplished in the following two steps: the 
emissions inventory and, if necessary, air quality modeling.152 The MOU 
requires, “as early as possible in its planning process,” the Lead Agency 
(the BLM in the case of the Uintah Basin) to identify the “reasonably 
foreseeable number of oil and gas wells” expected in the planning 
area.153 The BLM then prepares an “Emissions Inventory of criteria 
pollutants and volatile organic compounds,”154 which is a preliminary 
assessment of all the likely emissions of the proposed action that will 
contribute to local and regional air quality.155 The BLM uses the 
Emissions Inventory to determine if air quality modeling is necessary.156  
 Air quality modeling is necessary if certain criteria are met relative 
to the expected emissions/impacts and the geographic location of the 
proposed action.157 The BLM models potential air quality only if the 
Emissions Inventory determines that the expected emissions will cause 
or contribute to an exceedance of the NAAQS and the proposed action is 
                                                 




151. Id. § I. 
152. Id. § V.E. 
153. Id. § V.E.1. 
154. Id. § V.E.2. 
155. Id. § III. 
156. Id. § V.E.2. 
157. Id. § V.E.3. 
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in, or near, a nonattainment area for that NAAQS or in, or near, an area 
that is already predicted to exceed the NAAQS.158  
 Various air quality modeling methods are described in the appendix 
of the MOU. The modeling is a technical, quantitative analysis of air 
quality in a broad region.159 Air quality modeling was not previously 
done as part of the NEPA process, so the EPA is optimistic that the 
MOU will help improve impacts analysis and lead to more effective and 
efficient mitigation.160 
 Unfortunately, while the MOU is likely to increase air quality 
modeling in areas of non-attainment, it still falls short of requiring earlier 
emissions inventories, increased modeling, or better mitigation in areas 
of attainment.  
 First, the BLM does not conduct its Emissions Inventory until it is 
permitting at the project level. Recall, the Emissions Inventory is based 
on anticipated emissions from “reasonably foreseeable number of oil and 
gas wells.” The BLM does not anticipate the reasonably foreseeable 
number of wells at the RMP or leasing level because there are too many 
factors to consider. However, it could. The BLM has guidance 
documents advising it to create reasonably foreseeable development 
scenarios “based primarily on geology (potential for oil and gas resource 
occurrence) and past and present oil and gas activity.161  Such decisions 
are made at all levels of planning, including the RMP.162 The MOU 
points to this document in its definition of “reasonably foreseeable 
number of wells.”163 The appendix of the MOU includes a concept paper 
with an example of air quality modeling that is meant to be used at these 
early stages to get a broad idea of the likely changes in air quality.164 
 Second, the MOU does not require air quality modeling when the 
proposed actions (or the cumulative effects of the proposed action) are 
not likely to contribute to an exceedance of the NAAQS—based only on 
the preliminary Emissions Inventory. This allows the BLM to dictate 
when it will do any modeling because the BLM prepares its own 
preliminary Emissions Inventory.  
                                                 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at app. 
160. Interview with Kate Fay, U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Feb. 25, 2012). 
161. ROCKY MOUNTAIN FEDERAL LEADERSHIP FORUM ON OIL AND GAS, NEPA, AND AIR 
QUALITY, INTERAGENCY REFERENCE GUIDE, REASONABLY FORESEEABLE DEVELOPMENT 
SCENARIOS AND CUMULATIVE EFFECTS ANALYSIS 3 (2003) [hereinafter GUIDE TO REASONABLY 
FORESEEABLE DEVELOPMENT SCENARIOS]. 
162. Id. at 6. 
163. MOU, supra note 128, § III. 
164. Id. at app. 
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 Third, the MOU does not force the BLM to require more 
comprehensive mitigation of project developers. The MOU pledges to 
“identify reasonable mitigation and control measures and design features 
to address adverse impacts to air quality,” but, the BLM still has wide 
discretion to evaluate these measures and determine whether to 
implement them in permits or leases.165  
 Because the MOU does not change the legal authority of any 
signatory agencies or impose any additional responsibilities on them,166 it 
is understandable that the MOU leaves the BLM discretionary 
procedures largely intact. 
B. The New EIS for Natural Gas Development in the Uintah Basin Fo-
cuses on Ozone Mitigation 
 In March 2012, the BLM released a project-level EIS evaluating 
proposed oil and natural gas drilling in the Greater Natural Buttes Project 
Area (GNBPA) of the Uintah Basin of northeastern Utah.167 The GNBPA 
consists of approximately 162,911 acres in an existing gas-producing 
region of northeast Utah.168 Surface land ownership in the GNBPA 
consists of approximately 54 percent federal government (managed for 
mineral leasing by the BLM), 20 percent State of Utah, 24 percent Ute 
Tribe, and 1 percent private landowners.169 The BLM Vernal Field Office 
has jurisdiction over all federal public lands in the GNBPA.170 The 
project proponent is Kerr-McGee Oil & Gas Onshore LP (KMG), a 
wholly owned subsidiary of Anadarko Petroleum Corporation.171 KMG 
owns contractual leasehold rights for approximately 85 percent of the 
GNBPA.172  
 The EIS evaluates four alternatives for the GNBPA: No Action, 
Proposed Action (proposed by KMG), Resource Protection (preferred by 
the BLM), and Optimal Recovery.173The No Action alternative would 
include no new well development, but it contemplates environmental 
impacts associated with already-permitted drilling activities.174 The 
Proposed Action alternative is for over 3,600 new wells with one well 
                                                 
165. Id. § IV. 
166. Id. § VIII.A. 
167. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, § 1.1. 
168. Id. 
169. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS ROD, supra note 10, § 2. 
170. GREATER NATURAL BUTTES EIS, supra note 13, § 1.1. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. § 2.0. 
174. Id. § 2.4. 
2013] Sewing Up the Regulatory Hole 317 
pad per twenty acres.175 The Resource Protection alternative is also for 
over 3,600 new wells, but some wells would share the same wellpad so 
there would be one well pad per forty acres.176 Finally, the Optimal 
Recovery alternative would have over 13,000 new wells at one well pad 
per ten acres.177 On May 7, 2012, Secretary of Interior Salazar approved 
the Resource Protection Alternative in a Record of Decision.178 
 All the alternatives analyzed in the EIS involve hydraulic fracturing 
(“fracking”), which involves pumping fluids under high pressure into a 
natural gas formation to create fractures, thereby increasing the 
productivity of the well.179 Moreover, all of the alternatives, including 
the no action alternative, are likely to involve ozone levels above the 
NAAQS.180 This is because ozone levels above the NAAQS have already 
been observed during the past two winters in the Uintah Basin.181 The 
EPA made comments on the air quality analysis in the EIS, in which it 
commended the BLM and KMG for taking voluntary measures to reduce 
ozone, but the EPA did not protest the approval of any new development 
in an area that is already seeing winter ozone levels above the 
NAAQS.182 
 The positive aspects of the GNBPA EIS are the voluntary 
mitigation and adaptive management programs it describes to go along 
with either the Proposed Action or Resource Protection alternatives.183 
KMG has voluntarily agreed to an “ozone action plan,” which includes 
using low-emissions devices and green completions.184 KMG also agreed 
to implement a project-specific adaptive management plan that includes 
“enhanced” ozone mitigation measures in the event of an exceedance of 
the NAAQS.185 The enhanced mitigation measures include reducing the 
number of drill rigs operating at any one time, in addition to using 
natural gas engines that have lower emissions than traditional diesel 
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engines.186 These measures were not included in the Vernal RMP from 
2008 or the Draft GNBPA EIS from 2010.187  
 The inclusion of mitigation specifically for ozone in the Final EIS 
demonstrates that both the BLM and the natural gas industry realize the 
urgency of the ozone problem in the Uintah Basin. 
C. The EPA Regulations Require Ozone Mitigation in All New Natural 
Gas Development 
 In April 2012, the EPA issued “cost-effective” regulations to reduce 
emissions of VOCs and other pollutants like methane and benzene from 
oil and natural gas development.188 These regulations have been in the 
works since early 2010 when the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia issued a consent decree ordering the EPA to review its New 
Source Performance Standards under Section 111 of the Clean Air 
Act.189 The final rules are the first federal air standards for natural gas 
wells that address fracking emissions.190 According to the EPA, these 
regulations provide significant environmental benefits while still 
allowing responsible growth in U.S. oil and natural gas production.191 
The new regulations basically require natural gas developers to reduce 
emissions of VOCs by 95 percent in newly fracked or refracked wells.192 
The changes that are required include either burning or capturing gas that 
is currently being leaked into the atmosphere during the well completion 
process.193 Because developers can sell the captured gas, the EPA 
estimates that the new regulations will result in cost savings to industry 
of between $11 and $19 million when the rules are fully implemented in 
2015.194 Industry has been quick to point out that they have already been 
employing these methods in about half the fracked natural gas wells in 
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the U.S.,195 and that these processes are already required by both 
Wyoming and Colorado.196 
 The EPA’s new regulations require changes at four stages of the 
natural gas development process: well sites, gathering and boosting 
stations, processing plants, and compressor stations.197 After a well is 
drilled, it must be “completed.” Completion is the process when the well 
is prepared for gas to flow from it. Fracking occurs during the 
completion process.198 Once completed, gas is pumped into transmission 
lines. After natural gas leaves the well, it may travel to a gathering or 
boosting station (“gathering station”). A gathering station collects gas 
from multiple wells and helps move it towards a processing plant.199 
Gathering stations use compressors to move the gas along a pipeline to 
compressor stations.200 Eventually, the gas moves to processing plants 
where impurities are removed, and the gas is prepared for delivery to 
industrial and residential customers.201 The regulations do not apply to 
the transmission or delivery of gas after it passes through a processing 
plant because the VOC content is very low.202  
 These NSPS regulations targeted fracked wells because VOCs are 
emitted during the “flowback” stage of the well completion process for 
fracked wells.203 During fracking, sand or artificial ceramic materials 
(proppant) are injected into the fractures to keep them open.204 After 
fracking, the fracturing fluids are withdrawn, but the proppant remains in 
the fractures.205 During this flowback period, which lasts three-to-ten 
days, water, gas, and fracking fluids come to the surface at high velocity 
and volume.206  
 The new regulations require the escaping gas be either burned or 
captured during the flowback stage.207 There are two phases of the new 
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regulations.208 During the first phase (before Jan. 1, 2015), VOC 
emissions must be reduced by either destroying the gas through flaring 
(burning), or by capturing the gas for sale back into the system (“green 
completions”).209 After Jan. 1, 2015, all VOC reductions must be green 
completions.210 Exploratory wells and low-pressure wells are excepted 
from the green completion requirement, but these wells still have to 
implement flaring in order to burn off excess gas instead of emitting it 
into the atmosphere.211The EPA offers an extra incentive for refracked 
wells to employ green completions before 2015: the refracking process 
will not be treated as a modification, and thus the operator will not have 
to apply for additional Clean Air Act permits.212 
 In addition to requirements on the wells themselves, the new EPA 
regulations require a reduction of 95 percent of VOC emissions from 
storage vessels, pneumatic controllers, and compressor stations located at 
wellsites or between wellsites and processing stations.213 The EPA 
estimates that reducing VOC emissions by 95 percent will result in 
combined annual emission-reductions of 190,000 to 290,000 tons of 
VOCs.214 Utah does not have any state regulations for green completions, 
so this is a step in the right direction for the Uintah Basin.  
 Overall, this new NSPS fills in the gaps of the Clean Air Act, under 
which small sources were not as stringently regulated in attainment 
areas. 
 The NSPS regulations do have some significant limitations, 
however. First, the EPA could be doing more and quicker. For example, 
the regulations have a two-and-a-half year phase-in for green 
completions, there are no regulations for pneumatic controllers and 
compressors on the transmission side, and exploratory wells are 
exempted. Further, the new standards do not regulate mobile sources of 
VOCs and NOx. Finally, the new regulations are only for new wells. 
Thus, they do nothing to improve the already high levels of winter ozone 
observed in the Uintah Basin for the last three years.  
 The EPA and BLM’s new policies and regulations are a step in the 
right direction, but they are not enough. 
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V. RECOMMENDATIONS GOING FORWARD 
 The BLM may say, “let it flow,” but new natural gas development 
in the Uintah basin should not come at the expense of air quality. Under 
their current statutes and regulations, the EPA and BLM are not 
preventing ozone levels that already far exceed the standards set to 
protect human health. The new policies and regulations discussed in this 
article are a step in the right direction, but they are not enough. The 
MOU is not binding, and the BLM retains complete discretion whether to 
conduct air quality monitoring and how much mitigation to require. The 
BLM approved the GNBPA project despite likely NAAQS exceedances, 
which demonstrates that the BLM is more committed to energy 
development than environmental protection. The NSPS regulations only 
apply to new development and do not deal with mobile sources. 
  While the EPA could tighten its NAAQS for ozone, or declare the 
Uintah Basin in non-attainment, the ozone problem cannot be solved 
without significant changes in BLM procedures. The BLM should utilize 
the MLP process as it was intended to develop consistent mitigation 
strategies and apply them across state and field office borders.215 More 
importantly, the BLM should implement air quality modeling at either 
the RMP or MLP stage or both, and not wait for the APD stage. The 
models should consider the potential emissions of any likely 
development scenarios. These reasonably foreseeable development 
scenarios should be based on current geologic knowledge of available 
gas resources, current and anticipated price of natural gas related to cost 
of extraction (including cost of environmental compliance), and 
technology available for extraction, and not merely based on gas 
development that has been proposed or already approved. Then the BLM 
should create permitting scenarios that will prevent exceedance of 
NAAQS and stop approving new permits once that threshold is reached. 
 Finally, the natural gas industry cannot be left off the hook. 
Developers should not wait to be told how to mitigate and when because 
then they might not have the opportunity to choose the methods that are 
most cost efficient. Developers should take the lead and implement 
voluntary ozone mitigation, as Kerr-McGee is doing in the Greater 
Natural Buttes Project Area.  
 Only when every responsible entity takes ownership of the ozone 
problem can we really begin to sew up the regulatory hole. 
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